The Executive Summary from the Iraq Study Group report has been released. We're told by NBC that the full report - due at 11:00 - clocks in at 96 pages with 76 specific recommendations. One of which we catch a glimpse into on page three of the summary:
The United States cannot achieve its goals in the Middle East unless it deals directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict and regional instability. There must be a renewed and sustained commitment by the United States to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts: Lebanon, Syria, and President Bush's June 2002 commitment to a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. This commitment must include direct talks with, by, and between Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians (those who accept Israel's right to exist), and Syria.
UPDATE 12/06 @ 11:34: The full report has been released, downloaded, and uploaded for your reading pleasure. You can also see the report page-by-page in HTML view thanks to TTLB. It's a little confusing, but if you want it, it's here.
UPDATE 12/06 @ 12:27: The ISG has endorsed the Palestinian so-called 'right of return' by including it as an issue to be discussed as part of an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. This is what they wrote:
Concerning the Palestinian issue, elements of that negotiated peace should include:
- Adherence to UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and to the principle of land for peace, which are the only bases for achieving peace.
- Strong support for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian Authority to take the lead in preparing the way for negotiations with Israel.
- A major effort to move from the current hostilities by consolidating the cease-fire reached between the Palestinians and the Israelis in November 2006.
- Support for a Palestinian national unity government.
- Sustainable negotiations leading to a final peace settlement along the lines of President Bush’s two-state solution, which would address the key final status issues of borders, settlements, Jerusalem, the right of return, and the end of conflict.
UPDATE 12/06 @ 12:34: Here are the sections from the ISG report that we found most pertinent to our issues (aside from the above), along with commentary in italics:
"Dealing with Iran and Syria"
Dealing with Iran and Syria is controversial. Nevertheless, it is our view that in diplomacy, a nation can and should engage its adversaries and enemies to try to resolve conflicts and differences consistent with its own interests. Accordingly, the Support Group should actively engage Iran and Syria in its diplomatic dialogue, without preconditions. The Study Group recognizes that U.S. relationships with Iran and Syria involve difficult issues that must be resolved. Diplomatic talks should be extensive and substantive, and they will require a balancing of interests. The United States has diplomatic, economic, and military disincentives available in approaches to both Iran and Syria. However, the United States should also consider incentives to try to engage them constructively, much as it did successfully with Libya. Some of the possible incentives to Iran, Syria, or both include:
i. An Iraq that does not disintegrate and destabilize its neighbors and the region.
ii. The continuing role of the United States in preventing the Taliban from destabilizing Afghanistan.
iii. Accession to international organizations, including the World Trade Organization.
iv. Prospects for enhanced diplomatic relations with the United States.
v. The prospect of a U.S. policy that emphasizes political and economic reforms instead of (as Iran now perceives it) advocating regime change.
vi. Prospects for a real, complete, and secure peace to be negotiated between Israel and Syria, with U.S. involvement as part of a broader initiative on Arab-Israeli peace as outlined below
There are so many assumptions here that are disputed by the facts on the ground. Both Syria and Iran do not have an interest in a stable Iraq. If they did, they would not be sending, training and supplying terrorists to and in Iraq. The ISG also assumes that these regimes desire enhanced diplomatic relations with the U.S., but there's no such thing as a free lunch, so one must ask at what cost... the Iranians have already put their bill on the table, and they want the U.S. out of Iraq, and will likely want Western concessions on their nuclear program. That, in a word, is entirely unacceptable.
Under the aegis of the New Diplomatic Offensive and the Support Group, the United States should engage directly with Iran and Syria in order to try to obtain their commitment to constructive policies toward Iraq and other regional issues. In engaging Syria and Iran, the United States should consider incentives, as well as disincentives, in seeking constructive results.
Engaging Iran is problematic, especially given the state of the U.S.-Iranian relationship. Yet the United States and Iran cooperated in Afghanistan, and both sides should explore whether this model can be replicated in the case of Iraq. Although Iran sees it in its interest to have the United States bogged down in Iraq, Iran’s interests would not be served by a failure of U.S. policy in Iraq that led to chaos and the territorial disintegration of the Iraqi state. Iran’s population is slightly more than 50 percent Persian, but it has a large Azeri minority (24 percent of the population) as well as Kurdish and Arab minorities. Worst-case scenarios in Iraq could inflame sectarian tensions within Iran, with serious consequences for Iranian national security interests. Our limited contacts with Iran’s government lead us to believe that its leaders are likely to say they will not participate in diplomatic efforts to support stability in Iraq. They attribute this reluctance to their belief that the United States seeks regime change in Iran. Nevertheless, as one of Iraq’s neighbors Iran should be asked to assume its responsibility to participate in the Support Group. An Iranian refusal to do so would demonstrate to Iraq and the rest of the world Iran’s rejectionist attitude and approach, which could lead to its isolation. Further, Iran’s refusal to cooperate on this matter would diminish its prospects of engaging with the United States in the broader dialogue it seeks.
The U.S. has tried the carrot and stick approach with Iran in particular, and it's failed. The nuclear incentive package has languished and the regime has been successful to this point in stalling the international community while it continues its work on uranium enrichment and reprocessing. Iran would benefit though an unstable Iraq - it would provide an opportunity for the regime to spread the Shiite Islamic Revolution. The ISG knows that Iran does not want to play a constructive role in Iraq, and have layed out the plans for when that happens. It's a no-win situation. Engaging Iran would not be a wise move. Instead of isolation, it provides legitimacy and shows weakness in the eyes of the Iranians.
Although the U.S.-Syrian relationship is at a low point, both countries have important interests in the region that could be enhanced if they were able to establish some common ground on how to move forward. This approach worked effectively in the early 1990s. In this context, Syria’s national interests in the Arab-Israeli dispute are important and can be brought into play. Syria can make a major contribution to Iraq’s stability in several ways. Accordingly, the Study Group recommends the following:
Syria can control its border with Iraq to the maximum extent possible and work together with Iraqis on joint patrols on the border. Doing so will help stem the flow of funding, insurgents, and terrorists in and out of Iraq.
- Syria can establish hotlines to exchange information with the Iraqis.
- Syria can increase its political and economic cooperation with Iraq.
First off, let's state the obvious. Yes, Syria CAN establish hotlines and exchange information with Iraq, and it CAN increase political and economic cooperation with Iraq, but if they haven't shown any interest in doing so to this point, does the ISG expect Damascus to read this report and say, "Yes! That's what we'll do!" No, that's not what the ISG envisions. They envision a tit-for-tat. Syria will help in Iraq as long as the Syria-Israel dispute is brought into play for Syria's benefit. The Golan Heights isn't THAT strategic... is it? Of course, the ISG has already layed out portions of the peace plan! Keep reading...
Concerning Syria, some elements of that negotiated peace should be:
- Syria’s full adherence to UN Security Council Resolution 1701 of August 2006, which provides the framework for Lebanon to regain sovereign control over its territory.
- Syria’s full cooperation with all investigations into political assassinations in Lebanon, especially those of Rafik Hariri and Pierre Gemayel.
- A verifiable cessation of Syrian aid to Hezbollah and the use of Syrian territory for transshipment of Iranian weapons and aid to Hezbollah. (This step would do much to solve Israel’s problem with Hezbollah.)
- Syria’s use of its influence with Hamas and Hezbollah for the release of the captured Israeli Defense Force soldiers.
- A verifiable cessation of Syrian efforts to undermine the democratically elected government of Lebanon.
- A verifiable cessation of arms shipments from or transiting through Syria for Hamas and other radical Palestinian groups.
- A Syrian commitment to help obtain from Hamas an acknowledgment of Israel’s right to exist.
- Greater Syrian efforts to seal its border with Iraq.
In exchange for these actions and in the context of a full and secure peace agreement, the Israelis should return the Golan Heights, with a U.S. security guarantee for Israel that could include an international force on the border, including U.S. troops if requested by both parties.
UPDATE 12/06 @ 12:44: We've made the full text of the ISG press conference available by clicking here. As you'll read in the transcript, Barbara Slavin from USA Today addressed some of the issues we're concerned with above in her question:
Q Barbara Slavin of USA Today. One of the aspects of your report is outreach to Iran and Syria. What indications do you have from the discussions that you had in preparing the report that these two countries are prepared to be at all helpful? And I notice that you've taken the nuclear issue out of the equation. You say that should not be discussed in connection with Iraq. Why would the Iranians agree to come to a table and talk about Iraq unless the nuclear question and other questions were addressed?
MR. BAKER: Why did they agree to come to the table and talk about Afghanistan without talking about the nuclear issue? They did and they helped us, and it was important. In our discussions with them -- and the report points this out, Barbara -- we didn't get the feeling that Iran is chomping at the bit to come to the table with us to talk about Iraq, and in fact, we say there we think they very well might not. But we also say we ought to put it to them, though, so that the world will see the rejectionist attitude that they are projecting by that action.
With respect to Syria, there's some strong indications that they would be in a position if we were able to enter into a constructive dialogue, that they could -- would be in a position to help us and might want to help us. But we're specific in the report. There must be 10 or 11 or 12 things we say there that Syria -- that we will be asking of Syria. The suggestion that somehow we're going to sacrifice the investigations of Pierre Gemayel and assassinations of Gemayel and Hariri or others is just ridiculous.
So we're talking not about talking to be talking. We're talking about tough diplomacy.
MR. HAMILTON: May I simply add to that that I think all of us feel here that both Iran and Syria have a lot of influence in the region and have a lot of impact on Iraq. Iran probably today is the national power that has the single greatest influence inside Iraq today. We will be criticized, I'm sure, for talking with our adversaries, but I do not see how you solve these problems without talking to them.
We have no exaggerated expectations of what can happen. We recognize that it's not likely to happen quickly. On the other hand, if you don't talk to them, we don't see much likelihood of progress being made. You cannot look at this area of the world and pick and choose among the countries that you're going to deal with. Everything in the Middle East is connected to everything else. And this diplomatic initiative that we have put forward recognizes that.
MR. BAKER: And let me just add to that, if I might, that for 40 years we talked to the Soviet Union during a time when they were committed to wiping us off the face of the Earth. So you talk to your enemies, not just your friends.
Sorry, but we're not dealing with the Soviet Union here...
