Today, President Bush and Israeli PM Ehud Olmert will meet for the second time at the White House to discuss the strong bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Israel, as well as a wide range of regional and international issues. However, as David Makovsky lays out, the domestic and foreign policy context of both leaders will be sharply different from the time of their first formal encounter in May. As a result, their agenda is likely to be more fluid than that of their last encounter in Washington.
Beyond Iraq, there is a question about whether or not Bush may be leaning closer to a national security policy favored by his father. Bush 41 is part of the "realist" school that puts a premium on the external foreign policy behavior of regimes regardless of their internal dynamics. At the November 8 press conference, Bush announced that he is replacing Secretary Rumsfeld with a man Bush 41 appointed DCI, Robert Gates. Two years ago, Gates coauthored a study at the Council on Foreign Relations that called for a dialogue with Iran.
When Olmert is in political trouble, he has tended to lean more toward the right. Last spring, he had just won political victory as head of the new Kadima party, which had made an alliance with Labor. Now, Israel's war with Hezbollah has weakened Olmert. In order to halt political hemorrhaging, Olmert sought to stabilize his coalition by adding the right-wing Yisrael Beitenu party. The inclusion of the 11-member faction gave Olmert 78 seats in the 120-member Knesset.
The future of Kadima is linked to providing some hope on the Arab peace issue. Some wonder if Lieberman’s inclusion will stymie Olmert on the Palestinian situation, given that Lieberman has a hardline record on the issue. Lieberman insists that he now favors a two-state solution, though this includes a controversial gerrymandering of Israeli Arabs and the territory upon which they reside inside the Palestinian state. Olmert appears to be confident that, if a serious peace option presents itself, he can always jettison his Yisrael Beitenu partners.
Israel's focus has been in the military sphere, not diplomatic, as of late. Fearing Hamas will seek to emulate Hezbollah by accelerating Qassam rocket fire into Israel or smuggling advanced weaponry, Israel has sought to destroy dozens of tunnels in southern Gaza. Israel also just completed military operations to halt the firing of Qassam rockets from northern Gaza into southern Israel. While these military moves cannot be divorced from the sensitive negotiations between Hamas and Abbas on the formation of a non-Hamas government, it is unclear - judging from Israel’s actions - if Israel sees any relationship between the two.
For now, Hamas has cut off talks with Abbas, who is pushing Hamas into ceding power and agreeing to a government of technocrats. Without the pressure of sanctions and their impact on Palestinian public opinion, which is registering in polls that show growing disapproval of Hamas rule, it is unthinkable that Hamas could have reached the point of even considering a technocratic government. Clearly, if Abbas and Hamas prove to be successful in reaching an agreement, pressure would mount within Israel - and not from the U.S. - urging Olmert to avoid the dissolution of the Palestinian Authority and launch bilateral negotiations.
So far, the U.S. has confined its activity to asking Gen. Keith Dayton to head a $23 million effort that would build secure infrastructure on the Palestinian side of the Karni border crossing. The goal is to facilitate Palestinian trade with Israel and the outside world, and bolster Abbas's standing. Last week, the Israeli cabinet approved its support for Dayton's plan, which will sharply increase the size of Abbas's Presidential Guard in order to fulfill security tasks that include securing the Karni facilities, upgrading security at Rafah, and obtaining weaponry from Egypt.
A top issue of joint concern is the Iranian nuclear program. Will U.S.-Israeli bilateral consultations intensify? Will Olmert urge the U.S. to include a timetable for Security Council resolutions on Iran so the pace of diplomacy matches the pace of the Iranian nuclear program?
One cannot preclude that Olmert will complain about the lack of implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701. Israeli dissatisfaction centers on the failure to adhere to 1701's call for an arms embargo. Syria has successfully intimidated the international peacekeepers who are supposed to set up roadblocks on the Syria-Lebanon border. While Israel had low expectations that peacekeepers would actively root out Hezbollah arms, there was an assumption that Hezbollah would avoid openly brandishing weapons. However, they have been more brazen of late, even south of the Litani River in southern Lebanon.
Regionally, you can argue Israel is in an enviable diplomatic position. Focused on the Iran threat, Arab states are thinking about how to make the Saudi Peace Initative more palatable to Israel (a start would have been inviting them to the table in the first place). Syria is also publicly calling for talks with Israel. Olmert may talk to Bush about looking at several opportunities outside the Palestinian issue. Some key figures in the Olmert coalition believe that, given the prospects of a looming confrontation with Iran, it is critical to explore whether Damascus is willing to engage in a strategic reorientation along the lines of Egypt in the 1970s. In the case of Syria, such a reorientation would involve a move away from Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad.
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